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Abstract—A blockchain is a distributed ledger forming a 
distributed consensus on a history of transactions. It is the 
underlying technology for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, but there 
are many applications beyond the financial sector. With 
blockchain’s built-in security and removal of the need for third 
party trust, blockchain has started to see some use within 
contract applications among other things. In this paper, we 
present the design and implementation of a permissioned-based 
blockchain third party consent management system, whose policy 
can be decided by a government agency. We have constructed a 
proof of concept implementation using Hyperledger Fabric to 
provide a service that allows end-users to control and consent to 
who manages their private information. We believe our solution 
meets the guiding principles of EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). While our performance and usability 
evaluation are limited, our solution design and its 
implementation meet the 7 foundational principles of privacy by 
design. 
Keywords— Blockchain, consent management, user privacy, 
GDPR, Hyperledger, privacy by design. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GPDR), a new large set of restrictions and rules 
have been placed upon data usage and collection, with large 
penalties if a business fails to comply. The GDPR has greatly 
increased the scope of how all businesses that process EU 
citizens data are affected. Businesses must provide a clear 
description of what is involved in their consent agreements, as 
well as having an easy method of consent withdrawal. In 
consideration of a customer’s data rights, there are several 
subject rights. In an attempt to summarize the rights described 
in the GDPR policy, we will list them and give a small 
description. The first right, Notification of Breach, a company 
must notify customers as soon as a data breach were to happen. 
Right to Access is the right that a customer must be notified if 
there data is being accessed for processing. The Right to be 
Forgotten, is the customers right to revoke access of a 
company to their data. The GDPR also promotes privacy by 
design which we will describe in more detail in the following 
paragraph. Finally, the GDPR will have Data Protection 
Officers, a group of people who will ensure that companies are 
complying with the appropriate data policies [1]. 
Even outside of the EU, there are many reasons why 
businesses would want to adopt these rules. In Canada, surveys 
have shown that it is a potential business advantage to leverage 
these rules to further protect private and secure data, such as 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada [2]. Secure 
data can be defined in several ways. Any personal information 
relating to a customer is considered confidential and secure, so 
no one should be able to access it without permission. 
Information in this category includes, but is not limited to: 
photographs and IP addresses, contact lists, voice-print bio-
metrics used in voice recognition apps, location information. 
This information can be collected by a malicious entity, 
combining many pieces of information creates an overview and 
insight into a victim’s life. When rules are in place to protect 
this data, customers have been shown to feel significantly more 
confident in the company having their data, and their 
capabilities to protect it. Some examples of rules are in place to 
protect customers include application liability, which states that 
“Under Canada’s private sector privacy legislation, an 
organization is accountable for personal information that it 
collects, uses and discloses”, meaning that a business has a 
capital interest in treating customer information with care, and 
protecting it. All of this has significant impact on how software 
and data management systems are designed, since previously 
companies had no reason to get rid of data upon a user’s 
request. 
This now leads developers who would like to develop 
software using appropriate privacy policies, with several 
choices. The first choice is to develop their own in-house 
solution, developing their own privacy policy, and assuring 
customers that they are being upfront and honest in their 
dealings. This solution may not be adequate for many 
customers, as there is no way to ensure the company is 
handling their data as they say. The next option, would be to 
use a third party solution. This solution would need to have its 
policies decided by a government organization, and companies 
wishing to participate would need to be accredited by this 
organization. This would ensure that companies complied with 
the given policies, and that the policies could be made or 
altered by the elected party in accordance with the citizens 
wishes. This leads us to our next problem, the system enforcing 
these policies must be open and transparent about its privacy 
practices, as outlined by the Office of the Privacy 
2 
 
Commissioner of Canada. Companies and users participating 
in this system will want to ensure that the history of their 
transactions is immutable, yet remain private. Blockchain 
seems like an excellent way to implement several of these 
features. The blockchain is an immutable ledger, that provides 
a history of transactions, but allows the details to remain 
private [3]. It is a peer-to-peer network (in a permissionless 
blockchain) that removes the need of a third-party to authorize 
transactions. This fulfills most of our requirements but does not 
allow for a governing body to set policy on these transactions. 
In order to do this, we believe a permissioned blockchain with 
immediate finality [4] such as Hyperledger Fabric is needed. 
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of 
a permissioned-based blockchain third party consent 
management system, whose policy can be decided by a 
government agency. We will mostly be discussing the technical 
implementation of such a system, unless its implementation is 
directly affected by government policy. In order to do so, the 
remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we will present an overview of the background and related 
work. Section III introduces and discusses the design and 
implementation of our proposed solution. Evaluation results 
are presented in Section IV. Finally, conclusions and ideas for 
future work are presented in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
One of the main premises that blockchain is built on, is the 
fact that security built into it removes the need for the trust of a 
third party. The trust is placed upon a distributed set of actors 
which as the added benefit of also making it hard to trace-back 
to a user from a permission record of theirs. This reduces the 
impact of trust since many of the actors have different interests 
making a malicious consent hard to coordinate. Also, the 
immutability makes a blockchain a great solution for consent 
management as once a permission is granted it is recorded in 
the ledger and becomes immutable, the way to revoke this 
permission is to add another record to the chain stating that it 
has been done so. It is also possible to keep transactions 
anonymous, despite them being announced publicly in a 
permissionless blockchain. The public keys can be kept 
private, and the public will only be able to see that there is a 
transaction, and will not know the who the user of the public 
key is [3]. 
Hyperledger is self coined, as a distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) [5]. It is an implementation of a modular 
blockchain architecture. It provides many features that we find 
may be suitable for developing a possible implementation of a 
consent management system. Hyperledger Fabric provides an 
identity management system, which is to say they require every 
user to be authenticated to participate and transact on the 
blockchain. This means that different levels of permissions can 
be applied to different users [5]. The extra level of permission 
management allows a centralized authority to allow certain 
users to transact with the blockchain in different ways. For 
example, a company may only be given read permission, and 
only users can manipulate the global state. This may at first 
seem to go against the idea of blockchain as a peer to peer 
network. However, if we look at the perspective of a 
government trying to regulate a privacy policy in order to 
protect their citizens rights, then a privacy policy that can be 
reinforced through code and developed by lawmakers, is an 
ideal solution. Additionally, due to the use of authentication 
(permissioned blockchain), compute intensive consensus 
algorithms such as the proof-of-work concepts are not needed, 
which makes Hyperledger a more scalable option. 
Blockchain and its many applications are an active area of 
research. Most of the research related to privacy and consent 
management is being done in the medical industry, as patients’ 
data is very lucrative in this field, and their rights must be 
protected. Genestier et al. [6] developed an application for a 
distributed consent management in using patient’s information. 
In their model, the user can give permission for 3rd party 
companies to collect information on the patient, whether this is 
the use of records, or real time monitoring of the patient. 
Hyperledger was used for many of the same reasons we 
selected Hyperledger too. The second example of research 
being done is by Benchoufi et al. [7, 8] who have proposed 
using a blockchain solution in clinical trial research. 
Apparently, there has been some trouble with ensuring 
stakeholders do not manipulate results, and ensuring that trial 
properly collect consent from trial members, and properly 
inform the members of any new information and renewal of 
product given in testing. Finally Gammon [9] described the 
benefits of consent management using blockchain, and some 
similar technologies that already exist. There are several 
Medical related solutions [9]. In Longenesis [10], they use a 
decentralized system to provide a medical record marketplace. 
Selling your data is essentially exchanging value on the 
blockchain, which is what the blockchain excels at. Nebula 
Genomics [11], is under a similar branch, as they will purchase 
a user’s entire genome, especially if the patient has unique 
health conditions. MedRec [12], which aligns with Genestier et 
al.’s design [6], and is used for sharing medical records. 
Estonian e-health has also already implemented a blockchain 
system giving patients access control of their data [9]. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Before presenting the proposed solution, we will discuss 
the assumptions we have made and then present the 
architecture of the solution and the proof of concept prototype 
we have implemented, followed by the challenges we have 
faced. 
A. Assumptions 
The major assumption made is that our proposed solution 
will be supported by a trusted organization. For example, 
ISO/PC 317 [13] Consumer protection: privacy by design for 
consumer goods and services, could provide an accreditation 
for a privacy policy management system. This accreditation 
would be similar to ISO 9001:20015 [14] which requires an 
organization to meet several quality requirements. Using this 
accreditation system and Hyperledger Fabric permissioned 
based system, we could require that companies wishing to 
participate in our blockchain are accredited. The policy would 
need to include several requirements from the companies 
participating. Companies would need to comply with any 
updates to user permissions. As an example, if a user were to 
revoke access their phone number the company would need to 
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delete it from their internal database. Or even better yet, the 
company would only access the data in our database, updating 
the ledger in a request for a key, thereby alerting the user that 
their data is being accessed. Once a company has accessed a 
users data, they would be able to keep it forever, but should not 
mean that they can use it in any context they wish – only for 
the context the data was collected for. A development of a 
good privacy policy would entail the particulars of how that 
data is handled, and how to hold a company liable for it. This 
includes any breaches to the users data, and would motivate 
companies to leave the storage of data to the centralized 
database of the server. We are also under the assumption that 
users would not want their permission settings to be public to 
other companies. This means that given a permission asset, it 
must be impossible to determine what user that belongs to. The 
final assumption that we make, is that companies are not 
concerned with being connected to permission item, thereby 
reducing computational complexity. 
B. System Architecture 
The overall architecture of our solution can be described as 
having three main components: The blockchain network, the 
REST API consortium (composer REST API, our REST API, 
and front-end), and the external database. Figure 1 depicts the 
current and implemented architecture of our system. As you 
can see, both the user and the companies need to register to 
utilize the system. The front-end handles all the requests to 
Hyperledger, and all requests for data from the back-end. 
These interactions will be described in more detail in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
Figure 1: System architecture 
We also considered an alternate architecture (Figure 2), 
where each user would have their own application to interact 
with Hyperledger and the data requests from the back-end. 
This would be to allow a company to interact with our 
application through the use of an API. Companies would be 
able to integrate our solution into their own applications how 
they would like, and have all interactions controlled 
programmatically. 
 
Figure 2: Alternative system architecture (not implemented) 
1) Blockchain Network 
Hypderledger Fabric, which is the underlying blockchain is 
configured and managed by Hyperledger composer [5, 15]. 
Some configurations of Fabric are not done by composer and 
this is the network architecture. This is in regards to the 
organization, orderer, peer, and CouchDB modules. To handle 
this configuration, a basic sample network was used as it fills 
the needs of the prototype. The fabric network used is 
illustrated in Figure 3. It involves one organization, which is 
responsible for the management of the blockchain network, 
which is used by Composer. It also uses one orderer node, 
which is responsible for the creation of the blocks that get put 
on the blockchain, this is abstracted from the peer nodes in 
order to improve performance [15]. The network also features 
one peer node, which is what hosts the ledger or the 
blockchain. Finally, a CouchDB node is used as the data store 
in order to manage data and allow data persistence. 
 
Figure 3: Hyperledger Fabric basic network 
2) REST API 
In order to perform operations on the network or to just 
query data, Hyperledger Composer allows for the generation of 
a REST API to handle requests [15]. For simplicity, the REST 
API uses an Admin credential card with full access to the 
network to perform requests. The idea being to use an external 
server/application as a gateway to this REST API. Our own 
REST API was developed in order to make use of the database 
and to facilitate authentication for the front-end which was 
developed to allow users to register/login and add/edit 
permissions as well as view companies. Companies can also 
register/login to the front-end to view the data they have been 
given permission to see. 
3) External Database 
Another key issue, as previously mentioned, is 
implementing GDPR’s “right to be forgotten” within a 
blockchain system. The actual blockchain within Fabric is an 
immutable ledger, this means all versions of every asset are 
always going to be in the blockchain, with the most up-to-date 
versions being in the global state of Fabric [5]. Hence, storing 
the user’s information in the blockchain is not viable, since 
once it was added, it could never be deleted, and might be 
visible to unauthorized parties. To solve this, a separate 
database is used to store the actual user information, which is 
why the permission assets in the blockchain use Boolean flags 
instead of the real information. A Mongo database was used as 
the database [16]. This database also generates a unique ID for 
each user entry, which is the user ID used to make pair key 
hashes described earlier. 
C. Implementation 
The first question to be answered to implement this system 
was what should and should not be stored in the blockchain. As 
mentioned in our assumptions, users should not be able to be 
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traced from their permissions, nor should companies be able to 
trace users they have to the permissions said users have set for 
other companies. It is still required, however, to be able to link 
users to their permissions entries, but only to authorized 
parties. Hyperledger Fabric allows for data to be represented as 
key-value pairs [5]. Assets are therefore required to be 
identified by a reference field, which will act as the key. For 
the permissions assets, the reference field is a hash of the user’s 
ID and the company’s ID. The assets also have a reference to 
the company they are associated with, which allows for the 
company’s information to be retrieved upon querying the 
permissions, rather than just getting the company’s ID and 
requiring a second query to get the name of the company. The 
remaining fields of the permissions assets are Boolean flags 
which indicate whether the company is allowed access to the 
respective information. For example, “email: false, name: 
true”, indicates the company is allowed access to the user’s 
name, but not their email address. The other kind of data in the 
blockchain network is companies. It is assumed companies 
want their information to be readily available, so it was put into 
the blockchain, which better allows permissions to be linked to 
them. A company entry is simply some information fields 
designed to inform the user about the company, as well as a 
unique ID, which is implemented with UUID version 4. This 
unique ID is the company ID used in the pair key for the 
permissions assets. 
The login information, including the users email or the 
companies name, as well as the password hash (plus a salt) of 
the user/company are stored in a database. Our REST API is 
then used to interact with this database. The REST API is 
responsible for handling user/company registration and login. 
Users enter their information on registration to have it added to 
the database. Companies, upon registering, only need to give 
their company name and a password. Once they have logged in 
after registering, they are prompted to enter their company 
information, which, along with their company name, is added 
to Hyperledger. Once a user logs in, they can view the list of 
companies in the system, so they can better identify the 
companies they want to give permissions to. They can then add 
permissions setting for a given company, as well as edit 
existing ones. Finally, users can also delete their account, 
which sets all permission settings to all be false, deletes their 
information from the database, and then logs the user out. It is 
worth noting the user will be warned and prompted to type 
“DELETE” and click confirm before any deletion occurs. The 
Hyperledger Composer REST API does allow for delete 
requests, however, we opted for setting all permissions to false, 
for two reasons. Firstly, the underlying blockchain will always 
have the history of the permission settings, so true deletion is 
not possible. Secondly, companies would have to recognize 
that permission entries were deleted in order to determine 
which set of information to delete. By setting all permissions to 
false, a message can be given to the companies telling them 
that the entry with the given pair key has been deleted, so they 
recognize that they must delete the information they have with 
that pair key. In order for companies to see the data they have 
access to, first the front-end sends a request to the REST API. 
The REST API then queries the Composer REST API for all 
permissions assets that have the same company ID as the 
currently authenticated company. The REST API uses the 
permission flags to determine what user information they get 
from the database and to send back to the front-end. Upon 
receiving the information, the front-end then renders each 
permission entry separately. The pair keys can be used by the 
companies to identify the individual entries. 
D. Scalability 
The underlying blockchain software (Hyperledger) we used 
in our implementation allowed our system to be scalable. 
Hyperledger Fabric, which is the actual blockchain system, 
operates using several docker containers [5]. Having more 
peers improves the availability, given each peer hosts an 
instance of both the ledger and any chain code. This 
availability, however, is limited to querying. Any updates to 
the ledger require all peers to reach consensus to ensure the 
transaction is valid. Adding more peers, therefore, will slow 
down updates, but it also makes it harder for the network to be 
fooled by a malicious user and prevents the system from 
having a single point of failure [5]. 
The REST server generated by Composer can also be used 
as a Docker container. Being a REST API, the server can 
simply be duplicated and have multiple instances of itself 
running to handle more requests. A common way to do this 
efficiently would be to use either Docker Swarm [17] or 
Kubernetes [18]. Likewise, our REST API can be similarly 
scaled using Docker Swarm or Kubernetes. The front-end can 
also be served by our REST API, allowing it to have more 
availability too. 
E. Challenges 
There were many challenges in developing and 
implementing the proposed solution, which mainly fell in to 
three main categories: overhead of learning concepts and 
technology related to blockchain, technical issues dealing with 
the various implementations of that technology, and ensuring 
permissions cannot be traced back to users. The solution to the 
first challenge was just due diligence on our part. We 
researched any problems or misunderstandings we had in order 
to fill out our understanding of the subject. For example, if all 
transactions are transparent, how will a user remain private? It 
turns out this can easily be done by keeping the public key 
anonymous [3]. We also had to research several development 
platforms and attempt a preliminary design in order to flush out 
possible problems with the platforms. For example, Ethereum, 
did not have the permission-based control we felt we needed. 
The next problem we ran into was understanding and 
developing on the platform we decided on, Hyperledger. We 
realised right away that developing on Hyperledger would be a 
very grueling and painstaking endeavour, if we built from the 
ground up. We found a solution to this by using Hyperledger 
Fabric, as a framework for building on. However, this still 
required vast amount of knowledge, and quite a large amount 
of work to build the appropriate network for our application, 
and that is without even taking our original objective into 
consideration. In order to circumvent this problem, and focus 
on our objective, we found Hyperledger-Composer, which uses 
the Hyperledger Fabric framework, but is easily configurable. 
Obviously, this caused its own set of problems. This is because 
such a high level of abstraction requires a large knowledge of 
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the underlying components when errors and bugs start to occur 
during development. One instance of this was when we found 
that Hyperledger was not responding. When we traced the error 
through the extensive system, we found that it was possibly 
because of GRPC connection timeouts. Obviously a more in-
depth knowledge of the system, built over time of development 
on it, would give us a better idea of what was going wrong, and 
how to troubleshoot it. The end result was that it there was a 
comma missing in the configuration file that relates to the 
GRPC connection. The third challenge we faced, was a set of 
problems that came with our actual objective. We needed to 
keep a reference to users in permission items, without having 
them traceable to the user. The solution to this was that we kept 
an id of permission items in a hash of the user id and the 
company id. In this case, the user id must be known to trace the 
user to the corresponding permission item, which can only be 
found in our database. The second issue in this set, was 
implementing the “right to be forgotten” to allow users to 
delete their account and data. This is a problem when it comes 
to blockchain and more specifically Hyperledger Fabric, given 
the ledger is an immutable history of transactions [5]. The 
solution we developed to accomplish this was to update all 
permission to false, thereby requiring a change in the global 
state, and then deleting the user from our database. This solves 
the problem, because once the user id is gone, there is no way 
to trace it back to the user. 
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS 
The evaluation of the performance and usability is limited. 
The POST/PUT requests to composer’s REST API seem very 
slow. The requests tend to take roughly 3 seconds, even when 
all nodes are on localhost. Hyperledger Fabric is a permission 
based blockchain, and is able to use more computationally 
efficient methods than proof-of-work to reach consensus, 
however, these methods still take a considerable amount of 
time. All transactions must reach a consensus by a pre-set 
number of nodes in order to change the global state. 
For the usability evaluation, while we have not done any 
actual user experiments, our prototype implementation seems 
to fill many of the requirements set out by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada [2] in their design for 
privacy. The interface is simple, and the user can give 
permission just as easily as they can remove it. The user can 
browse companies in a single list, and add/edit permissions as 
they wish. The interface for companies is also very simple, and 
not much work is needed beyond writing a script to get 
whatever information they can. They can use our rest API to 
automate the process, or just use our front-end as their needs 
dictate. Overall, we feel this project is successful in building 
the groundwork for a third party regulated consent 
management system, and feel there is a great deal of 
applications this can be used for. 
We also evaluated our proposed solution based on the 
Privacy by Design 7 Foundational Principles as outlined in 
[19]. The 7 foundational principles are: proactive not reactive: 
preventative not remedial; privacy as the default setting; 
privacy embedded into design; full functionality: positive-sum, 
not zero-sum; end-to-end security: full-lifecycle protection; 
visibility and transparency: keep it open; respect for user 
privacy: keep it user-centric. 
A. Proactive not reactive 
In order for a company to be able to be a part of this system 
they must be accredited first by a set of criteria so that way we 
can validate their processes in terms of handling the data that is 
allowed to them through the system. This way we can assure 
privacy and security of the data before it is given out, instead 
of afterwards when they have already been given the data. 
B. Privacy as the deafult setting 
Privacy as the default setting means a user’s information is 
private by design and if they want to make it available, they 
need to explicitly allow it [19]. For example, for a social 
networking site, users cannot see your information unless you 
allow other users to see it, rather than the default being they 
can see it and you must explicitly turn it off. With this 
definition in mind, our system follows this principle, given that 
a company has no knowledge whatsoever about a user until 
they add permissions for that company. Even then, the 
company can only see the information they have been given 
access to by the user. 
C. Privacy embedded into design 
Our system was built with privacy and security as top 
priorities. The system was designed from the ground up using 
privacy and security principles to ensure that privacy was 
embedded into our design. Each element within our 
architecture keeps these ideas in mind, and we ensured that no 
sections violated these principles. 
D. Full functionality 
This principle is based off the assumption that there is 
typically a trade off between privacy and security [19]. In our 
system, we take this principle to heart, and have tried to create 
the highest amount of security and privacy possible. With our 
design, the data is only able to be accessed with user 
permission, and can only be understood with user consent, 
making our system meet both the requirements for security and 
privacy. 
E. End-to-end security 
This principle involves the assurance that all aspects of the 
system are secure [19]. Our system, being a proof of concept 
prototype, does not meet this fully, given there is little security 
between the back-end and database, as well as between the 
front-end/back-end and the Composer REST API. This was 
done for convenience and the technologies involved all allow 
for much better methods of security, which could certainly be 
utilized. Therefore, even though our system as it stands does 
not meet complete end-to-end security, it would be very 
reasonable for it to meet this principle if needed. 
F. Visibility and transparency 
The idea being visibility and transparency is to ensure a 
system is “secure” simply because no one knows, except the 
creators of the system, how it works [19]. By making the 
6 
 
system open source for example, you allow others to verify the 
security of the system [19]. For our project to follow this 
principle we would need to make it open source. All the tools 
we used, specifically Hyperledger, are all open source tools, 
allows this system to follow this principle. 
G. Respect for user privacy 
The idea for this principle is that the user should be 
involved and have a significant say in their own privacy [19]. 
Our system design directly implements this idea by giving the 
user full control over their data and privacy. The user is the 
only one who can access their data without explicit permission, 
maintaining this principle. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have presented the design and 
implementation of a system that we believe meets the guiding 
principles set by GDPR regarding data privacy. Blockchain 
presents inherent issues in regard to the removal of data, 
however our system has provided a secure way to avoid putting 
blockchain in the first place, while maintaining the privileges 
of data access in the secure blockchain. Our system makes sure 
that privileges are kept secure and anonymous on the 
blockchain, with no way of retrieval after the customer 
removes their data. this provides a succinct way to protect 
customer rights, while maintaining the integrity of the 
blockchain. Our implementation source code is freely available 
and can be downloaded from [20]. 
In addition, we have identified two potential use cases 
where our solution would be able to be used in real world 
applications. First, our solution could be used in medical and 
clinical trials. Using our solution would ensure stakeholders do 
not tamper with trial results and ensure test subjects are 
informed on every step. This would enhance patient privacy 
and control over their data, while simultaneously guaranteeing 
the validity of the data being used in the experiments. 
The second use case we have identified, is having a 
company which customers can use to store their data, which 
third part companies would have to go through to access their 
data. Instead of each company holding on to their individual 
copy of the data, the customer data could be consolidated in a 
single location, with the customers in control of permissions. 
This of course bring us back to the idea of a committee 
ensuring that any company using the database, is properly 
accredited by a standards organisation. 
For future work, there are many areas where it can be 
scaled up and improved. The first area that we can work on, is 
the scaling of Hyperledger. By design, our solution should be 
able to scale to a fairly large size. While doing so, it must 
remain responsive and practical. This will need to be simulated 
and tested as best as possible. The next area is to provide 
access cards for a user/company to set their permissions with. 
This will make it easier to authenticate with the composer 
REST server. Another addition would be the use of a second 
key pair in transactions as an additional firewall. This would 
prevent the ability to link transactions to a single public key 
[3]. The final area we would like to see work done, is that of 
developing a standard privacy policy, and ensuring that any 
companies partaking in the blockchain consent management 
system are properly accredited. 
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